Much of the empirical literature examining the relationship between unions and fi rm performance focuses on associations between the presence of a union and performance. Negative fi ndings are interpreted as evidence that unions cause fi rms to be ineffi cient by abusing their monopoly power. However, other factors may cause an observed negative relationship between union presence and a fi rm's performance. For example, poor industrial relations or working conditions may cause unionization in the fi rst place or industries in which unions are present may be in decline. This issue has been dealt with by endogenizing the presence of unions, that is, taking into account, in the estimation of union eff ects, the factors that may explain the presence of labour unions in certain fi rms in the fi rst place. The fi ndings of these studies are more nuanced (see Addison 2005 for a review) and in the UK the observed eff ects of union presence on productivity have generally been improving since the 1990s (Bryson et al. 2005 , Blanchfl ower et al. 2007 ). However, union presence covers both cases where union voice is exercised in the context of some dialogue with management (even if this dialogue is minimal) and cases where there is no dialogue at all. If there is no dialogue, voice may be exercised primarily by default in the form of resistance or "collective exit" behaviour (Freeman 1976 ) such as withdrawing labour, or may not be exercised at all. For example, management may not inform employee representatives of planned workplace change. In these cases, workplaces are more likely to have poor industrial relations, or other problems, whose impact on performance may confound voice eff ects.
In this chapter, we choose to focus on the extent to which employee voice is exercised. In particular, we make an explicit distinction between cases where employee representatives are involved in the change process (and voice is exercised) and cases where employee representation is present in the organization, but has not been involved in the change process. Our approach does not allow us to resolve all endogeneity issues. However, focusing on a particular topic for dialogue -workplace change -and the extent to which employee representatives are involved in the process makes it possible to identify the eff ects of employee voice clearly and separately from those of the presence of employee representation when voice is not exercised. Workplace change lends itself particularly well to this type of investigation. It is one of the very cases in which theory suggests employee voice should foster cooperation and improve performance. Interestingly, employers adopt a range of industrial relations attitudes when introducing change, from not informing or consulting employee representatives to actually negotiating the process.
It seems trivial, as we celebrate the anniversary of the fi rst International Labour Convention on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, Fathi Fakhfakh, Virginie Pérotin and Andrew Robinson -9781849809832 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/25/2019 04:39:07AM via free access adopted in 1949, to remark that the rights to organize and to bargain collectively form part of the fundamental rights at work and as such, must be protected even if their exercise is costly. 2 Examining whether collective bargaining, and more generally employee voice, aff ects fi rm performance may contribute usefully to policy design. Enforcing fundamental rights will be easier if they have a positive impact on fi rm performance, especially if performance improves suffi ciently to make up for the costs of possible associated pay increases and improvements in working conditions. If involving employee representatives in workplace issues has a negative impact on performance, the implications for policy are more complex. In particular, labour union involvement in workplace change may have a negative relative impact not only if unions abuse monopoly power, but also if they protect individual workers from excessive or uncompensated changes that worsen the conditions under which they work. Unions acting in this way may correct distortions due to monopsony power on the part of employers (see Manning 2006) or ensure effi cient levels of health and safety are provided, and in the process supply a public good. In this case, supportive regulation may be needed in order to create a level playing fi eld, so as not to penalize good employers and to encourage effi ciencypromoting behaviour.
This chapter fi rst compares the extent to which workplace change takes place and involves representatives of the workforce in British and French fi rms. For this and all of our analyses, we use the latest employment relations surveys in the two countries (the 2004-05 rounds of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey, WERS 04, and the French REPONSE survey -Enquête Relations Professionnelles et Négociations d'Entreprise). We then estimate the eff ects of workplace change on establishment performance and the eff ect of involving employee representatives in these changes. We investigate whether workplace change has a diff erent impact on productivity when labour unions and/or joint consultative bodies (joint consultative committees in the UK and works councils in France) are involved and whether higher levels of involvement are associated with greater productivity eff ects.
The UK and France have markedly diff erent industrial relations systems, but both countries have collective bargaining at the fi rm or establishment level. This level of bargaining activity has become the norm in both countries in recent years. 3 We look at the two types of formal employee representation that are involved in the bulk of workplace-level collective bargaining and other forms of collective negotiation and consultation in the two countries: union representatives 4 and joint consultative committees (UK) or works councils (France). In both countries, unions have bargaining rights, in particular on pay, whereas joint consultative committees and works councils are consultative bodies. In this sense, we are looking at institutions with similar roles in the two countries. However, the sources of these institutions' legitimacy and the contexts in which they operate profoundly diff er between the two countries. In the UK, union representation follows a formal union recognition process; joint consultative committees are established voluntarily. There is no equivalent process of union recognition in France, where several statutory obligations regarding employee representation apply to employers from a fairly small size. Unions can appoint representatives with statutory bargaining rights in workplaces where they have very few members, and employers have an obligation to enter negotiations on pay every year. Works councils are statutory in all medium-sized and large fi rms in France and have extensive information and consultation rights. However, the majority of employee members of joint consultative committees and works councils are union members, so that in both countries the two forms of representation -union representatives and consultative bodies -diff er more in their role than in whether they involve unions. In France, the workplace level of negotiation is only one part of a system in which much collective bargaining takes place nationally at the inter-industry and industry levels. In contrast, the enterprise level is the main level of collective bargaining in the UK, and multi-employer bargaining is now the exception in that country. However, the minimum pay levels agreed upon at the industry level in France are typically well below the minimum wage, which limits their practical relevance. Conversely, it has been argued that the practice of imitation pay increases in the UK has brought that country closer to centralized bargaining systems in practice (Schmidt and Dworschak 2006) . Union membership dropped in both countries in the 1980s and 1990s and in both countries union decline seems to have halted since the late 1990s, but union density remains much higher in the UK. Union membership has fallen "catastrophically" in France, which now has the lowest union density in Western Europe (GumbrellMcCormick and Hyman 2006) . However, legislation passed in the 1980s and 1990s has resulted in wide coverage of collective representation and a revival of collective bargaining and union presence on works councils (Amossé 2006 , Jacod 2007 . In the UK, union membership has stopped declining, particularly in union workplaces (Blanchfl ower et al. 2007) . Classic workplace-level negotiation has been displaced in part by consultation, but not for pay, and unions are still the primary bargaining partner in the UK (Charlwood and Terry 2007) .
We briefl y review the hypotheses regarding the relationship between employee representation and fi rm productivity in the next section. In section 5.3, we present key statistics about employee representation and workplace change in the two countries, together with our data and estimation procedures. We present and discuss our fi ndings in section 5.4 and draw conclusions in the fi nal section.
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, WORKPLACE CHANGE AND PRODUCTIVITY
The traditional view of unions in economics is that of a monopoly supplier of labour that will abuse its market power and focus on capturing rent (that is, profi t) from employers. While unions in the classic microeconomic model appropriate rent in the form of higher pay (at the expense of employment and effi ciency) rent can be captured in diff erent ways, for example by imposing restrictive practices and overstaffi ng (Freeman 1976) . Firm productivity may be cut as a result. This type of union resists change and/or imposes restrictive practices as a condition for workplace change. In this case, workplaces where employee representatives are involved in the change process should experience less favourable productivity outcomes. However, it is now widely thought that unions may also provide employees with a "voice" alternative to "exit" mechanisms such as quitting and reduced eff ort (Freeman 1976, Freeman and Medoff 1984) . Unions provide information on worker preferences more effi ciently than individual workers. This information makes it possible for management to off er working conditions that correspond to these preferences and to take employee interests into account in decisions. In addition, the union's capacity to withdraw labour, and therefore enforce labour-management contracts, will make such a management commitment credible. Employees' fear of dismissal should decrease and their cooperation and willingness to invest in fi rm-specifi c skills should increase, with positive eff ects on fi rm performance. In the case of workplace change processes, management of unionized workplaces may be able to make a credible commitment not to cut jobs, a particularly common concern associated with workplace change, in exchange for cooperation in productivity-increasing measures. Change should therefore be facilitated. Employees will be more willing to invest in new skills and to implement decisions in which they have had some say. In addition, case study evidence suggests that the consultation or negotiation process in itself may facilitate change by building trust between unions and management (see, for example, Ozaki 1996) . In this case, workplaces where employee representatives are involved in the change process should show greater productivity increases than other workplaces.
By making management's commitment to stable employment credible, the union would make effi cient contracting possible (Eguchi 2002) . More generally, bargaining models show that a range of outcomes may emerge depending on the union's relative preferences over the diff erent dimensions of the employment relationship. In particular, under certain conditions unions may be more interested in creating rents to safeguard future employment than in capturing them (Aidt and Sena 2005) . Depending on whether rent extraction or rent creation motives prevail, the eff ect of union involvement in the change process on productivity is ambiguous.
There is little empirical evidence that unions resist technological change or innovation (see, for example, Menezes-Filho et al. 1998 and Latreille 1992 for the UK). However, limited evidence suggests technical and organizational change causes work intensifi cation (Green 2004) . Even if unions do not abuse monopoly power, negative productivity diff erentials may be observed when unions are involved in change processes if unions protect individual workers against uncompensated or abusive deterioration in working conditions, including the health and safety environment. This may happen if unions counter monopsony power (Manning 2006) . Unions are also more effi cient than individual employees at securing optimal health and safety conditions. Such conditions constitute local public goods (Freeman 1976 ) and health and safety may also be "merit goods" over which individuals may make suboptimal decisions for their own welfare.
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Whether unions now have monopoly power in any given workplace in the UK is questionable since the reforms of the 1980s abolished closed shops. However, in a given workplace, a particular group of people (a shop) are represented by a single union in the UK. French unions have rarely been in formal monopoly positions and they tend to negotiate alongside other unions with diff erent political stances that represent the same group of people in a given workplace. However, it could be argued that the French constitutional protection of the right to strike gives French unions more power to withdraw labour than it may appear. For our purposes, modelling unions as having monopoly power may be an adequate approximation for analysing cases in which unions are involved in negotiating change processes or consulted, in the sense that unions may be able to mobilize employees to enforce the resulting explicit or implicit contract with management.
The situation in which unions are not involved in workplace change processes is likely to be quite diff erent. Unions that are not involved in change processes will not be able to provide information on employee preferences to management or promote productivity-increasing behaviour. Instead, they may at most channel employee concerns about the change process and morale and productivity may decline. Compared to union representatives who have statutory negotiation rights, joint consultative committees and works councils have less capacity to enforce contracts since they are consultative bodies and typically do not call strikes. This suggests that any productivity eff ects -whether positive or negative -would be less pronounced when these consultative bodies are involved in change processes rather than the formal union representatives. However, works councils typically debate over a wider range of issues than union representatives, so they may be able to infl uence a greater variety of aspects of the process. In addition, in the French case works council members are elected, while union representatives are not, so that works councils may be better informed of employee preferences. French works councils also have statutory information rights, which may make them more eff ective than British joint consultative committees. It has also been argued that when union representatives are engaged in pay bargaining at the workplace level at the same time, employers may allow them only a suboptimal level of involvement in other decisions for fear that the union would capture too large a share of profi t as its involvement increases (Freeman and Lazear 1995) . Joint consultative committees and works councils may therefore be more or less eff ective at increasing productivity than union representatives. However, we would not expect to observe joint consultative committees or works councils to have negative eff ects on performance in any case, as they are neither monopoly suppliers of labour nor as likely as union representatives to have the means to counter monopsony power.
DATA AND ESTIMATIONS

Data
The data we use are the 2004-05 editions of the British and French industrial relations surveys -WERS (Department of Trade and Industry 2005) and REPONSE respectively. Each of these two surveys comprises information on a range of human resource management and employee relations issues, as well as establishment-specifi c information collected from management in a sample of establishments, and information collected from employee representatives and a sample of employees in each establishment. We use the management part of the survey, and the subsample of trading organizations, which represents some 2,300 observations in WERS and 2,900 observations in REPONSE. For the manufacturing subsample of REPONSE, we also match the survey with fi rm-level accounting data from the annual enterprise survey (Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise or Fathi Fakhfakh, Virginie Pérotin and Andrew Robinson -9781849809832 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/25/2019 04:39:07AM via free access EAE). In each survey, the sample is stratifi ed by size and industry and a set of weights based on sampling proportions makes it possible to obtain a nationally representative sample. We use weighted data for all descriptive statistics and estimations.
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Our measure of workplace change is a composite measure of several different types of change that are loosely connected to technological change. These were reported by management to have occurred in the two years preceding the survey. A considerable amount of overlap among the diff erent groups of establishments concerned has led us to consider all these types of changes together rather than attempting to analyse each of them separately. The variable takes the value 1 if one or more types of change were introduced and 0 otherwise (variable defi nitions are provided in Appendix 5.1). Here, as with other variables, the survey questions are not identical across the two countries, but are suffi ciently similar that we can use them to approach the same issues for comparisons between the two countries.
Estimations
The hypotheses we discussed in section 5.2 suggest that productivity, and perhaps also profi tability, may be aff ected by change and voice. We focus primarily on measures of productivity, but also take into account the comparability of the types of measures used in the two surveys. Productivity is measured qualitatively in the British survey. It is measured quantitatively in the French survey, but for a subsample only, while the only qualitative performance measure in that survey is profi tability; so we use both measures for French workplaces. Our main measures of performance thus include qualitative, subjective measures of performance reported by managers (concerning "labour productivity" compared to other establishments in the same industry in the UK and "profi tability" compared to competitors in France -see Appendix 5.1). We estimate probit models explaining the probability of a workplace's performance taking the value 1 ("a lot better or better than average" -as opposed to 0 for the other cases). For France, the merger with the annual enterprise survey also allows us to estimate translog production functions for manufacturing industry so as to assess the eff ect of workplace change and voice on total factor productivity.
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Our multivariate analysis is carried out in two stages. In the fi rst stage, we investigate whether workplace change is associated with greater performance; whether the presence of union representatives and that of joint consultative committees (JCC, for Britain) or works councils (for France) aff ect performance; and whether workplaces that have both change and either type of employee representation have better Fathi Fakhfakh, Virginie Pérotin and Andrew Robinson -9781849809832 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/25/2019 04:39:07AM via free access performance, than workplaces that don't. In other words, we look at whether having change aff ects a workplace's performance and whether employee representation matters, compared to no workplace change and/ or no employee representation. This fi rst set of models is estimated on the full sample for each country. In these models we do not allow for the levels of voice or consultation with union representatives or the JCC/works council to vary across workplaces -the structure of the data does not allow it, since voice level information is only available for workplaces where there has been workplace change and employee representatives are present. This fi rst stage itself includes two types of models. We fi rst estimate the separate impacts of workplace change, of the presence of a union representative and of a JCC/works council on performance. The second set of estimations allows for interactions between workplace change and the union representative and JCC/works council variables. In these and all of our other models, we take into account other factors that determine performance by including a full range of standard control variables, including: size and sector dummy variables; the level of competition; workforce composition; and incentive and employee involvement practices. In the second stage, we focus on the eff ect of the level of voice, that is, the extent to which employee representatives were involved in the change process, on performance. Voice is "high" if change was "negotiated" with employee representatives, "medium" if they were "consulted" by management, and "low" if they were "informed". The default category is "not involved" (see Appendix 5.1 for variable defi nitions). For this analysis, we can only use workplaces that have experienced change since workplaces that do not undertake change cannot report on the extent of employee involvement in the change process. This selection might introduce bias in our estimates, for example, if employee representation is systematically associated with diff erent eff ects in workplaces that don't have change. In order to correct for the possible bias, we employ Heckman's estimation procedures (for probit and linear estimations as needed) in which the factors determining whether a workplace has change or not are taken into account in the estimation of the model.
The Heckman model includes two equations: the performance equation and the selection equation (which explains whether a fi rm has undergone workplace change or not). For this model, the selection equation should contain at least one variable that is not in the outcome equation. In this instance, we include information on whether the establishment is part of a multi-workplace establishment or group; whether its market is international; and four measures of the type of competition the fi rm faces -price, quality, innovation or "branding" -together with other variables included in the performance equation (size, workforce composition and so on).
For this second stage of the multivariate analysis, the categorical voice variables are missing for workplaces that did not have employee representation. For the estimations, we constructed a "voice" variable coded as "no voice" for these workplaces and according to the level of voice for the workplaces with representation (see details in Appendix 5.2). However, this artifi cially constructed variable has no meaning outside the interaction terms with employee representation variables, so we only report the marginal eff ects of the interaction terms.
In this second stage, we proceed once again in two steps. The fi rst set of models investigates the separate eff ects of the presence of union representatives, JCCs or works councils, and the constructed voice variable on performance amongst those fi rms that have undergone some change. The second set of models looks at the eff ects of involving employee representatives to various degrees in the change process by including interaction terms between the employee representation variables and the three levels of voice, the default category being workplaces where employee representatives were not involved. In these specifi cations, the separate eff ects estimated for each of the two forms of employee representation represent the eff ect of having employee representatives but not involving them in any way (not even informing them) in the change process. As before, we only report marginal eff ects (and estimated coeffi cients in the case of the production function) for the variables of interest. The full list of variables in the equation are found in Appendix 5.1 and additional notes on the estimations are provided in Appendix 5.2. Table 5 .1 presents, for each of the two countries, the proportions of workplaces that implemented changes in the two years preceding the survey. There is quite a lot of overlap between the groups of workplaces that implemented diff erent types of changes in both surveys. The survey questions were slightly diff erent in the two countries, but there is a striking diff erence that cannot be entirely due to diff erent questions: while about 80% of British workplaces had introduced change, only just over half of the French ones had.
FINDINGS
Change and Representation: Descriptive Statistics
In Table 5 .2, we look at the forms of employee representation present in workplaces with and without change, at the extent of their "voice" and at union density. Given the diff erences in statutory representation rights, it is not surprising to fi nd that there is considerably more representation in France than in the UK (54% of workplaces with change have Fathi Fakhfakh, Virginie Pérotin and Andrew Robinson -9781849809832 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/25/2019 04:39:07AM via free access representation in France, as against 18% in the UK, and the corresponding percentages are 44% and 5% in workplaces without change). However, union density is considerably lower in France, where 59.5% of workplaces have less than 5% of union members among employees, and only about 12% have a union density of more than 10% according to the survey. The fi gures we report in the last column on the right in Table 5 .2 show the proportion of workplaces that have more than 5% density. Interestingly, in both countries workplaces with change also have a greater union presence than workplaces without, but this may of course be due to other workplace characteristics like fi rm size. When there is employee representation in workplaces that implement change, the norm is for management to consult with employee representatives in the UK, except in cases where there is only trade union representation. In these workplaces that have trade union representation but no joint consultative committees, the most common case is for management not to involve employee representatives at all. This could be an indication of non-cooperative industrial relations generally, since no joint consultative committee has been set up in these workplaces. In France, where works councils are statutory in a large number of fi rms, the norm is for management not to involve employee representatives at all in the change process, whether there are trade union representatives (who have bargaining rights), a works council (with consultation rights) or both in the establishment. This case is slightly less dominant in workplaces where only unions are present, which in France will be smaller workplaces, where union representation signals a stronger union.
Estimations
Our fi rst set of estimations uses the full sample to assess the eff ect of workplace change on performance, and whether change has a diff erent eff ect where there is employee representation -without making a distinction between workplaces that involve employee voice and workplaces that don't. The results of these estimations are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. In the probit estimations (Table 5. 3), the marginal eff ects give us the eff ect of the categorical variables (workplace change, union representation and JCC or works council) being equal to 1 on the probability of performance being in the higher category. In the linear production function estimation (Table 5 .4) the estimated coeffi cients directly give us the proportionate eff ects of the categorical variables being equal to 1 on value added. In both countries, workplace change is associated with a better performance, though it should be noted that workplace change is not endogenized in these estimations. 10 In both countries, the presence of union representation is associated with a lower performance on average (left-hand side in workplaces with and without change. In the UK, unions are associated with no diff erence in productivity in workplaces that do not have change, but with a negative eff ect in workplaces that introduce change.
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The French estimates show unions having a negative eff ect in both types of workplaces with the probit specifi cation, but zero or positive net eff ects in both types of workplaces with the production function estimated on manufacturing workplaces. JCCs have a positive estimated eff ect in British workplaces that do not have change, but also show a negative association with performance in workplaces that do have change. In contrast, works councils are found to be associated with worse performance in French workplaces without change, and better performance where there is change. On the face of these initial results, we might think that in most cases and in both countries unions, and in the UK also JCCs, restrict the performance improvements that fi rms can obtain by introducing workplace change (assuming that our estimates had no bias due to endogeneity). However, we have not taken into account the level of voice granted to employee representatives in the workplaces that implement change.
The estimates presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 concern only workplaces that introduced change. These estimates provide comparisons between cases in which fi rms have no employee representation (the default, or reference group); cases in which there is representation but employee representatives have not been involved in any way in the change process; and cases in which employee representatives were involved in the process to a varying extent. The fi rst, and perhaps the most striking, fi nding from these estimates is that in both countries workplaces that have employee representatives but do not involve them at all in the change process -to the point of not even informing them -can have lower performance than workplaces that have no employee representation. There are two exceptions to this general fi nding. In the UK, workplaces where trade union representatives are not involved in the change process have the same performance as workplaces without representation; and in the production function estimates for French manufacturing we fi nd that workplaces with works councils that have not been involved are more productive than workplaces without representation.
UK -Labour productivity
The second key fi nding is that voice matters. In both countries it can, and in most cases does, raise the performance of fi rms with representation to a higher level than the performance of fi rms without representation. In the UK we fi nd that, compared to workplaces with no representation, JCCs have negative estimated eff ects when they are not involved, but zero or positive eff ects at higher voice levels. The French probit estimates show both unions and works councils having negative eff ects when they are not involved in change, but positive eff ects when they are involved at all levels, except for the highest voice level for unions (at which the estimated eff ect is zero). The production function estimates on French manufacturing workplaces show unions associated with a lower productivity where they are not involved in the change but all levels of voice having a positive counter eff ect, which is high enough for the net eff ect to be positive when the union is informed of the process. However, in these same estimates for French manufacturing fi rms, involvement with the change process decreases the positive eff ect of works councils, especially at low levels -although the productivity of workplaces with works councils remains higher than that of workplaces without representation. Although this result diff ers from the other fi ndings for France in that productivity is lower where works councils are involved than where they are not, consulting or negotiating with the works council is associated with higher productivity than merely informing it. In the UK equation, trade union representation is associated with neutral eff ects whether the union representatives are involved or not, though the eff ect may be negative when they are only informed (this marginal eff ect is only weakly signifi cant). Looking at the fi ndings in more detail, we can see interesting diff erences between the two countries, which confi rm the picture from descriptive statistics. While the eff ect associated with JCCs unambiguously improves with voice in the UK, unions have a zero estimated eff ect when they are not involved, a zero or possibly negative eff ect when they are only informed, and a neutral eff ect again when they are consulted or negotiate the process. As JCCs are voluntarily set up, management not even informing a JCC of technological change seems very odd and suggests there may be more fundamental problems in the workplaces concerned, such as poor management and/or bad industrial relations. This may cause the negative eff ect observed when a JCC is present but not involved. Union representation is less dependent on active involvement and goodwill on the part of management than setting up a joint committee. The possible negative eff ect associated with low union voice could be due to several factors, including perhaps a lack of cooperation with changes that may be viewed as abusive by the union and/or that it did not have a chance to discuss or negotiate. Overall, the UK results are not very contrasted. Although not involving JCCs or only informing union representatives is associated with worse performance, and consulting JCCs is associated with better performance, voice eff ects are otherwise neutral in comparison with workplaces that do not have representation. Given the greater incidence of consultation that we observe in British workplaces, it is possible that other forms of employee voice exist in workplaces that do not have formal union representation or JCCs, which we do not capture in this investigation.
The French results more clearly suggest that involving employee representatives of both types in the change process improves performance. In both types of estimation, higher voice improves the eff ect among workplaces that involve their works councils. In both types of estimations, involving union representatives (and works councils if we look at the probit estimations) is associated with better performance, and not involving them with worse performance, than not having employee representation. Yet we have seen that consultation is not the norm in French workplaces. These fi ndings suggest that the performance issue is not so much employee representatives' opposition to change when they are involved in the process as their lack of involvement. It is possible that the negative eff ects we observe are due to active opposition to changes that employee representatives were not consulted about. Given the low union density in French workplaces, it is perhaps just as likely that the lack of cooperation shown by management in not involving employee representatives in any way in the change process is indicative of serious industrial relations and perhaps other problems in these workplaces. Overall, the French results suggest that having active social dialogue is as important as having the institutions for employee representation. The fact that these institutions, though widespread, are not widely used may refl ect the low union density in that country. In these analyses, we have taken into account the selection of workplaces experiencing change for our estimations of voice eff ects, so that our fi ndings should not refl ect eff ects that are specifi c to workplaces that implement change. Other endogeneity issues, which the structure of the data does not allow us to correct for, are unlikely to aff ect the substance of our results. If union representation tends to arise in declining industries, correcting for this factor would dampen the negative eff ects we estimate and increase the level of the positive estimated eff ects. It is also possible that some of the eff ects we fi nd on these cross-sectional data are connected with persistent workplace characteristics that are unobserved in a cross-section but could be corrected for with a panel. Thus it could be that better managed fi rms are also those that allow employee voice, and poorly managed ones do not.
Overall, the mostly negative performance eff ects we see associated with representation institutions that are not involved in the change process does not necessarily imply either that those institutions have "bad" eff ects in these circumstances, or that the eff ects are entirely due to these institutions. Resisting workplace change that is imposed without consultation could improve allocative effi ciency if the proposed changes are abusive and unions eff ectively protect employees, though productivity may be cut. Workplaces in which employee representatives are present but not consulted or informed of change processes are also likely to have other management problems that cause the changes to have less favourable eff ects on performance than in other workplaces.
CONCLUSIONS
We set out to examine the eff ect of workplace change on performance, and the extent to which employee voice may improve this eff ect. Workplace change is widespread in the UK, and aff ects half of the workplaces surveyed in France. Although a smaller proportion of changing workplaces have employee representation in the UK than in France, the employee representatives tend to be consulted in the process in the UK, whereas the most common practice in French workplaces is for employee representatives not to be even informed of the change process. Yet, among workplaces that introduce change, workplaces that do not involve employee representatives or only inform them tend to perform Fathi Fakhfakh, Virginie Pérotin and Andrew Robinson -9781849809832 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/25/2019 04:39:07AM via free access worse than workplaces without employee representation in France, and to a certain extent in the UK. This diff erence in performance may be due to a number of factors. In particular, it is likely to refl ect poor industrial relations and perhaps generally poor management in these workplaces. In contrast, workplaces involving employee representatives in the process have a similar or better performance than workplaces without employee representation in both countries, and especially in France. This is consistent with the hypothesis that employee voice facilitates change by allowing employee concerns to be credibly taken into account in change processes. It is also consistent with case study evidence that consultation and negotiation processes build up trust between unions and management, thereby enabling other changes. The diff erences we observe between the UK and France may be explained, for example, by the tradition of industrial confl ict in France (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2006) and the diff erent sources from which employee representatives draw their legitimacy in the two countries. The higher incidence of consultation in the UK and the contrasting results found for French workplaces suggest that social dialogue is important for successful change processes and having employee representation institutions alone is not suffi cient for that dialogue to take place. A substantial and active labour union membership may be at least as important to support the dialogue that enables change processes to have the expected positive eff ects on fi rm performance. It is also possible that non-representative forms of employee voice are present in workplaces that don't have union-related employee representation in the UK, where a stronger culture of consultation may explain the comparatively less contrasted voice eff ects we observe for representative voice.
The overall results go in the same direction in the two countries, despite markedly diff erent employee relations systems. The specifi c institutions we looked at are also diff erent in their statutory rights and democratic accountability, even though they are broadly similar institutions in the two countries. Our fi ndings seem slightly more favourable to JCCs and works councils than to unions. This could be due to a number of factors, including the bargaining rights vested in unions, which may both incline employers to allow unions lower voice levels and mean that unions are involved in protecting employees from uncompensated or harmful changes in certain cases. Conversely, the broader range of issues typically dealt with by JCCs and works councils (and their representativeness in France) may allow them greater scope in negotiating change processes. However, overall the diff erences we observe between the eff ects associated with the two forms of representation are rather small. The diff erences we observe between the estimated eff ects of employee representation when it is given a voice and (Pérotin and Robinson 2003) . 3. Reviews of the recent evolution of workplace industrial relations can be found in Blanchfl ower et al. (2007) and Kersley et al. (2006) for the UK and in GumbrellMcCormick and Hyman (2006) for France (see also Ministère de l'Emploi 2008). 4. We focus on union representatives rather than union recognition in the UK because we are specifi cally interested in bargaining rather than union presence. A small proportion of British workplaces have union recognition but no representation (Charlwood and Terry 2007) . 5. Individuals may underestimate risk, whereas unions, which represent large numbers of employees, are likely to have a more accurate perception of risk. In this case as in the case where unions counter monopsony power and provide public goods, union involvement would be effi ciency increasing. For a review of health and safety levels in British workplaces, see Robinson and Smallman (2006) . 6. Bryson et al. (2005) suggest this may happen if unions are weak. Addison and Belfi eld (2004) suggest instead that weak unions are found to have more positive eff ects on performance. 7. Weighted estimations have been preferred for WERS and are appropriate here because the stratifi cation variables are correlated with unionization and, in France, with the regulation on statutory representation (see Reiter et al. 2005) . We also carried out estimations (not reported here) using the unweighted data, which gave qualitatively similar results with less strongly signifi cant coeffi cients. 8. The validity of subjective measures of performance has been the subject of debate. Forth and McNabb (2008) conclude that both subjective and objective measures can be usefully employed despite some points of divergence, though they do not consider total factor productivity among their objective measures of productivity. 9. We only report marginal eff ects for key variables of interest. The full list of control variables is given in Appendix 5. 
APPENDIX 5.2 ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE ESTIMATIONS
Marginal Eff ects for Interaction Variables
Calculating marginal eff ects for interaction terms in a probit model is more complex than for standard linear models and has been found to lead to some problems in the estimation and interpretation of conditional hypotheses (Hoetker 2007 , Ai and Norton 2003 , Norton et al. 2004 , Brambor et al. 2005 . This means that the interaction eff ect cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign, size and signifi cance of the coeffi cient on the interaction term. In non-linear models, such as our probit models, the interaction eff ect is determined by using both the coeffi cient on the interaction term and the coeffi cients of each constitutive term, together with the values of all the other independent variables (Hoetker 2007 ).
Construction of Voice Variables
As workplaces without representation had no voice variable, we created a voice variable coded as no voice ("not involved") for these workplaces.
In the British survey, separate voice variables were available for union representatives and for JCCs. We constructed a single voice variable which takes the higher of the two values if the level of involvement is not the same for union and JCC. These coding changes were carried out in order to limit the number of possible interaction terms between the different voice arrangements and to make it possible to compute meaningful marginal eff ects, particularly for the interaction terms. However, it should be emphasized that the resulting "voice" variable is an artifi cial construct computed for the purposes of the estimations and does not mean anything outside the interaction terms with union and JCC/ works council representation.
